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The Role of Auditing in the Management of Corporate Fraud 
Kamil Omoteso and Musa Obalola 
 
Introduction 
A business risk is considered to be anything that has the potential to prevent a business 
organisation from achieving its corporate objectives the foremost of which is shareholders’ 
wealth maximisation. From a broader perspective, a modern business will be concerned about 
a wide range of business risks. These include those associated with competitors’ activities 
(strategic risks), current and emerging legislations (compliance risks), debt financing and 
trade creditors (financial risks), purely externally-related issues (environmental risks) and 
day-to-day running of the entity (operational risks). Corporate fraud is a type of operational 
risk faced by businesses today. Although such fraud is as old as the existence of modern 
corporations, its frequency of occurrence and sophistication level have made it a matter for 
concern to both owners and managers of business enterprises. According to the latest ACFE’s 
Report to the Nations on Occupational Fraud and Abuse (ACFE’s Report, 2012), 77% of the 
global corporate fraud are perpetrated by employees in six main units of corporations (top 
management, accounting, operations, sales, purchases and customer services). Also, 
“reactions to recent corporate scandals have led the public and stakeholders to expect 
organizations to take a “no fraud tolerance” attitude. Good governance principles demand 
that an organization’s board of directors, or equivalent oversight body, ensure overall high 
ethical behaviour in the organization...” (The IIA et al., 2012). 
 
Examples of latest corporate fraud include some HSBC staff at its global subsidiaries 
laundering billions of dollars for drug cartels, terrorists and pariah states (Rushe, 2012),  three 
senior businessmen (John Maylam of Sainsbury’s, John Baxter and Andrew Behagg of 
Breenvale) jailed for siphoning almost £9 million from Sainsbury’s in a corrupt potato deal 
(Ward, 2012), the Citigroup’s mortgage-insurance fraud case involving two executives of the 
bank which “resulted in a $158.3 million settlement and an admission of wrongdoing by the 
bank” (Griffin and Ivry, 2012), Japanese electronics giant, Olympus’s admission that it 
concealed investment losses of £1.1 billion from the 1990s (Thomas, 2012) and Barclays 
manipulation of the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and the Euro Interbank Offered 
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Rate (EURIBOR) for which the bank was fined an unprecedented £59.5 million by the UK’s 
Financial Services Authority (FSA, 2012). Some other forms of modern corporate fraud 
schemes include bankruptcy fraud, tax fraud, stock fraud, embezzlement, bribery, forgery, 
conspiracy. 
Furthermore, there “has been all too evident in recent years, investigations of corporate 
debacles ... frequently uncovered instances of serious fraud and/or other malpractice by 
senior company officials, reckless financial and business management practices and/or 
ingenious creative accounting” (Porter, 2009: 156 – 157) and these horrible malpractices 
have been traced to weak corporate governance systems particularly in terms of codes, 
structures and functioning. As a result, most of the post-Enron governance codes emphasise 
the need for an effective internal control system that can prevent the abuse of companies’ 
assets or properties by corporate fraudsters. In addition, these codes place emphasis on good 
corporate governance that supports sound business risk management system as well as 
responsible and reliable financial reports that can satisfy all the stakeholders. For such good 
corporate governance to be attainable, Rezaee (2003) recommended a “six-legged stool” 
model comprising the active and transparent participation of the board of directors, the audit 
committee, the top management team, internal auditors, external auditors and regulatory 
bodies. This, he suggested, will provide a holistic solution to the governance problems (which 
give rise to the incidence of fraud) facing business establishments across the world. It is 
noteworthy that half of the Rezaee’s proposed stool’s six legs revolve around auditing.  
 
This chapter therefore adopts Porter’s “audit trinity” approach (which comprises internal 
audit, external Audit and the audit committee – the tripartite audit function) to discuss the 
role auditing can play in the management of corporate fraud through its preventive and 
detective capabilities. The chapter traces the historical background of external audit as an 
assurance service for the shareholders who have hired management experts to look after their 
businesses for them (the shareholders). In addition it maps the developments in the internal 
audit function as well as the emergence of the audit committee as a modern corporate 
governance and accountability umpire. It highlights different roles these three audit types can 
play in controlling corporate fraud and the relationships that should exist between them in 
order to support a sound internal control system as a tool for preventing and detecting 
corporate fraud. The chapter also discusses how internal controls and continuous online 
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auditing approach can be used to manage corporate frauds within computerised business 
environments.  
 
Background to the Tripartite Audit Function 
Although auditing as a profession began in the UK in the mid-19
th
 century, by the mid-20
th
 
century, the US had taken the front seat in driving its development, a position it still retains 
till today due to its high number of very large corporations. Between its inception and the 
current period, the main goal of auditing (external audit) had metamorphosed from the initial 
sole aim of fraud detection to multiple objectives comprising a certificate on the credibility of 
management’s annual reports and accounts, providing management advisory services, 
reporting doubts about an entity’s ability to carry on trading and helping to secure responsible 
corporate governance – For a further overview of the historical developments of auditing, see 
Porter et al. (2003: 18 – 38). 
 
Depending on those regarded as its main beneficiaries, an audit can be categorised as external 
audit or internal audit. An external audit requires independent experts to conduct an audit for 
the benefit of parties external to the audited entity while an internal audit is carried out by 
either employees of an entity or contracted personnel for the benefit of the entity's 
management.  
 
According to Omoteso (2006: 13), an external audit is an independent examination of the 
evidence upon which the financial statements of an entity are based, to generate an opinion as 
to whether the financial statements represent a ‘true and fair view’ and have been prepared in 
accordance with the applicable reporting framework. However, Cosserat, 2004: 666 defined 
internal audit as “an appraisal or monitoring activity established by management and 
directors, for the review of the accounting and internal control systems as a service to the 
entity. It functions by, amongst other things, examining, evaluating and reporting to 
management and the directors on the adequacy and effectiveness of components of the 
accounting and internal control systems”.  
 
The internal audit function within an organisation is responsible for monitoring the adequacy 
and the effectiveness of an entity's internal control systems. It is also usually charged with 
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issues relating to an organisation’s risk management and other aspects of governance. 
However, compared to external audit, internal audit is relatively new. It emerged as a service 
to the management and its importance, particularly to large organisations in ensuring good 
corporate governance and accountability, is very significant in modern day business. Further 
distinctions between external and internal audits are contained in the table below: 
 
Table 1: Differences Between External and Internal Audit 
 External Audit Internal Audit 
Independence Independent of entity Employed by management 
Responsibilities Fixed by relevant statutes Decided by management through the 
audit charter 
Accountable to Members/owners Management/audit committees 
Watchdog role Society’s corporate watchdog Internal corporate watchdog 
Scope of work Express an opinion on the  truth 
and fairness of financial 
statements prepared by the 
directors/management for 
presentation to shareholders 
Review whatever financial and 
operational areas management decides 
Regulated by Professional accounting 
bodies/government statutes 
The Institute of Internal auditors 
 
 
Despite the foregoing differences between external and internal audits, both forms of audit 
are substantially based on systematic assessment of evidence to draw some final conclusions 
that are often presented in the form of reports. Furthermore, International Standard on 
Auditing (ISA) 610 stipulates that external auditors must obtain a sufficient understanding of 
the work carried out by internal auditors to help in the planning and development of an 
effective audit approach. 
 
The third arm of auditing is the audit committee. It is the latest of the three arms to be 
institutionalised. Although the US’s Securities and Exchange Commission had accorded 
recognition to the audit committee as far back as 1940s, its functions and roles only rose into 
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prominence in the 1970s when it was made a requirement for board of directors of all listed 
companies to in the US and the UK. In the US, the post-Enron corporate governance code, 
Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002) further entrenched the role of audit committees in its Section 301.  
 
As a form of description, Rezaee (2009: 120) defined the audit committee as “a committee 
composed of independent, non-executive directors charged with oversight functions of 
ensuring responsible Corporate Governance , a reliable financial reporting process, an 
effective internal control structure, a credible audit function, an informed whistleblower 
complaint process and an appropriate code of business ethics with the purpose of creating 
long-term shareholder value while protecting the interests of other stakeholders”.  
 
By regulation, the audit committee must necessarily include, at least, a member with 
background in accounting. The committee should be effective enough to be able to assess and 
respond to risks of fraud particularly those frauds that may involve the management and other 
employees. It also monitors management’s activities relating to fraud prevention and 
detection and also oversees and liaises with internal and external auditors in matters relating 
to fraud. It regularly reviews the works of management and the internal audit function for all 
risk exposures including the risk of fraud. In addition, if necessary, the committee seeks legal 
advice on fraud related issues.       
 
Auditing and Risk 
The external auditor is statutorily required to assess the correctness of management assertions 
made in the financial statements. However, in order to be able to examine the fairness of 
these assertions, the auditor carries out audit procedures in the forms of risk evaluations and 
tests of accounting information based on credible audit evidence (Omoteso, 2013). The four 
popular approaches through which external auditors carry out their work are the substantive 
procedures approach, the balance sheet approach, the systems-based approach and the risk-
based approach. None of these four audit approaches is capable of single-handedly ensuring a 
perfect audit. Therefore, an auditor is expected to adopt more than one approach in order to 
avoid an audit failure.  Although the audit approach an auditor adopts will depend on the 
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nature and the circumstances of an audit engagement, of these four approaches, the systems-
based and the risk-based approaches are more generally adopted.  
 
Under the systems-based audit approach, external auditors evaluate an organisation’s internal 
controls systems’ effectiveness and, based on the results of this evaluation, focus their 
substantive procedures on the weak areas in which they assume control objectives may not be 
achievable. On the other hand, the risk-based approach to auditing emphasises directing audit 
resources towards the aspects of the financial statements that are susceptible to misstatements 
– either fraudulent or erroneous. ISA 315, “Identifying and Assessing the Risks of Material 
Misstatement through Understanding the Entity and Its Environment” compels auditors to 
adopt a risk-based approach (which is also referred to as business risk approach as it 
encompasses risks such as financial risks, compliance risks and operational risks). The 
standard requires auditors to carry out risk assessments of material misstatements at both the 
financial statement and assertion levels through auditors’ understanding the risk involved in 
the entity’s routine activities and environments (which include its internal control systems). 
Based on a comprehensive understanding of an entity and its environment, the auditor 
assesses risks within the organisation paying particular attention to the nature of the risks, 
relevant internal controls, and the desired level of audit evidence. According to Fraser (2011: 
1), “the result of the assessment effectively categorises the audit into (a) areas of significant 
risk of material misstatement that require specific responses and (b) areas of normal risk that 
can be addressed by standard audit work programs. Having assessed risks, the auditor then 
designs appropriate audit responses to those risks in order to obtain sufficient appropriate 
audit evidence on which to conclude”.   
 
Another dimension to risk in auditing is what is termed audit risk – “the risk that the auditor 
expresses an inappropriate audit opinion when the financial statements are materially 
misstated. Audit risk is a function of material misstatement and detection risk” (IAASB, 
2009). The audit risk model is a product of three types of risks. These are inherent risk (the 
susceptibility of an assertion to a misstatement e.g. provisions), control risk (the risk of 
misstatements in an assertion not being prevented, detected or corrected by internal control 
systems) and detection risk (the risk that the auditor’s procedure will not detect a 
misstatement in an assertion). 
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Apart from adopting the right audit approaches, an external auditor is required to adopt 
‘professional scepticism’ in carrying out the audit assignment.  This implies that regardless of 
previous years’ standards and quality, the auditor considers the possibility of material 
fraudulent/erroneous misstatements by management in the current year’s accounts. With this 
objective and an open mindset, the auditor will be alert to uncover any significant anomaly. 
As regards the internal audit function, risk management responsibilities on behalf of the 
management remains one of its three key functions (the other two being governance and 
control). This role requires internal auditors to work hand in hand with directors on the one 
hand and the audit committee on the other in designing, executing and reviewing risk policies 
and programmes within an organisation for organisational effectiveness.  
 
Corporate Fraud and Auditing 
The incidence of corporate fraud has reached an alarming level across the world. According 
to Hopwood et al. (2008), based on available statistics, business organisations in the United 
States lose hundreds of billions of dollars per year to fraud. Yet, most frauds against 
organisations are never reported to law enforcement authorities either because they involve 
only few hundred or thousand dollars or in order to avoid negative publicity and legal 
liability on the part of the companies concerned. Besides, such frauds can sometimes be hard 
to prove without a confession. In the context of corporate organisations, a fraud will possess 
the following elements: it is intentional; it involves deception or concealment by the culprit; it 
leads to deprival or loss to the corporation (victim); and it accords a dishonest advantage to 
the culprit over the victim. Corporate fraud schemes include but not limited to the following: 
– Assets misappropriation which is regarded as the most common (representing 87%) 
but least costly form of corporate fraud globally (The ACFE’s Report, 2012). 
– Accounts receivables frauds which comprise fraudulent credit approvals, improper 
credits and improper write-offs. 
– Expenditure cycle frauds which consist of improper purchases and payments, 
unauthorized purchases, fraudulent purchases to related parties, misappropriation of 
petty cash, abuse of company credit cards or expense accounts, unauthorised 
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payments, theft of company cheques, fraudulent returns, theft of inventory and other 
assets and payroll fraud.  
- Production cycle fraud involves theft of raw materials and finished goods.  
- Vendor Frauds involving short shipments, balance due billing, substandard goods and 
fraudulent cost-plus billing (Hopwood et al., 2008). 
 
According to Hopwood et al., possible reasons for corporate fraud include the following: 
– Poor employee compensation: Employees could steal to make up for what they think the 
company owes them. 
– Excessive pressure to perform: This can generate hostility toward the company, providing 
rationalizations for employees to cheat customers, vendors, and the company itself and to 
violate health and safety laws and regulations.  
– Hostile work environment: This situation can generate animosity towards the company, 
which can be a rationalisation to commit fraud.  
– Corporate financial troubles: Financial disorder tends to produce general chaos within the 
company, leading to a wide range of problems including employee dishonesty.  
– Negative examples set by top management  
As most corporate frauds involve companies’ misappropriation of companies’ assets such as 
funds and similar valuables (The ACFE’s Report, 2012), the role of accountants and, hence, 
auditing in the prevention and detection of fraud cannot be stressed too strongly. From the 
points of view of Lee (1993: 9) auditing can be regarded as “a social mechanism to assist in 
monitoring and controlling corporate managerial behaviour, and as a political tool of the 
state which attempts to explicitly signal its desire to provide a means of corporate 
governance. Economically, the corporate auditor is observed as an agent in an agency 
situation, acting as an adjudicator in contractual relationships involving potential conflict 
and moral hazard.”  
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From the agency theory perspective, just as the management, auditors are another form of 
agents of the shareholder as they are hired, remunerated and can be fired by the shareholders. 
They also report and are responsible to the shareholders. Nevertheless, the difference between 
these two sets of agents is that while directors run the company on a day-to-day basis 
presumably in the best interests of the shareholders, render accounts of their stewardship in 
the form of annual reports and accounts at the annual general meeting and take steps to 
prevent fraud by setting up a sound internal control system, auditors are: 
 required to report to shareholders on the truth and fairness of the financial statements 
prepared by the directors which reflect the directors’ stewardship of the shareholders’ 
company during the year, 
 required to assess the financial statements for full disclosures required by accounting 
standards and company law but 
 not responsible for detecting fraud except where fraud is so large that it would affect 
the ‘true and fair view’ of the financial statements being audited (Omoteso, 2013).  
 
According to Taylor (2011: 33), “the general public and the uninformed, which often sadly, 
includes financial journalists who should know better, often labour under the decision that 
one of the primary functions of [external] auditors is to detect fraud. For example, when 
questioned, ordinary members of the public think that auditors check all the transactions in 
the books, or prepare the accounts; they have little understanding of  risk-based audit 
techniques or systems-based approaches to auditing – and who can blame them?” 
In addition, had it been made as part of their responsibilities, it would have been a very 
difficult task for external auditors to be able to play a major role in fraud detection based on 
the following: 
1. External auditors drawing their conclusions based on samples because of constraints 
of time and resources 
2. It will be difficult for external auditors to uncover high level and methodically co-
ordinated fraud schemes particularly when such schemes involve top managers. 
3. Limited knowledge of the organisation and its staff 
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Humphrey (1997) commented that the audit expectations gap arises mainly as a result of 
auditors’ failure to detect and report fraud and errors when that is what the public expect 
them to do. Despite the emphasis made by ISA240 – ‘the  auditor’s responsibilities relating to 
fraud in an audit of financial statements’ – on management’s overall responsibility for fraud 
prevention and detection (in a way that should clarify the popular misconception on auditors’ 
duties regarding fraud), it is generally expected that external auditors’ procedures should be 
effective in uncovering material misstatements arising from either financial statements fraud 
or assets misappropriation and the subsequent alteration of accounting records.  
Furthermore, since the demise of the defunct Arthur Andersen (one of the then “Big5” 
accounting firms) brought about by the firm’s complicity in the Enron scandal in the US, 
audit firms have frequently been criticised for not being able to detect significant (material) 
corporate frauds.  For example, this was evident in the case of Olympus mentioned above 
where their auditors within the period, KPMG and Ernst and Young, were severely criticised. 
In the opinion of Mathiason (2009:1): “.... as bankers take a kicking from an increasingly 
irate public, auditors have avoided anger, even though they signed of trillion-dollar balance 
sheets, sanctioned increased dividends in the bank shares that collapsed months later, 
blithely assumed markets would function seamlessly and established controversial rules that 
inflated bubbles and amplified losses. ...  The fact that auditors have not been brought to 
book for their role in the crisis is causing frustration and alarm to a growing number of 
politicians, regulators, fund managers and academics.”   
Conversely, auditors continue to put forward the argument that due to limitations of 
personnel and time as well as the imperative of sampling techniques, audit 
regulation/standards only require them to provide a reasonable (rather than an absolute) 
assurance on an entity’s financial statements. In addition, they (external auditors) often argue 
that they only work on historical data financial records that are one year in arrears and this 
makes it difficult to uncover current fraud or to accurately predict future losses/problems. 
However, Taylor (2011: 36) concluded that although “it is acknowledged that external 
auditors have no direct responsibility for the detection of fraud but it is still part of the public 
perception that this is one of their principal functions. Thus, the success of the audit 
profession in detecting and deterring [cases such as those of] Madoffs and Stanfords is 
highly relevant to the overall impression the investing public has of business probity”.   
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While external audit may be “very poor at catching fraudsters” and constitutes a “weak 
deterrent to fraud” (Taylor, 2011: 33), the internal audit function is principally aimed at 
designing, implementing and monitoring an effective system of internal controls capable of 
preventing and detecting frauds and errors, hence, dubbed by Porter (2009) as the ‘internal 
corporate watchdog’. Notwithstanding the provisions of the Institute of Internal Auditors 
(IIA) which state the internal audit function is not directly responsible for fraud detection, the 
IIA requires internal auditors to investigate the causes of fraud, review fraud prevention and 
detection processes, facilitate corporate learning about fraud and hiring specialists for fraud 
investigations (Taylor, 2011: 44). 
However, in reality, the management and those in charge of governance within the 
organisation are directly responsible for fraud prevention, detection and deterrence. These 
may be carried out through the internal audit function as a control mechanism within the 
organisation while the audit committee performs an important oversight role towards 
ensuring the effectiveness of the internal audit function.  
 
Financial Statement Fraud and Auditing 
Financial statement fraud (FSF) is any undisclosed intentional or grossly negligent violation 
of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) that significantly affects the 
information in a set of financial statements. The Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of 
the Treadway Commission (COSO – 1992) reported various general areas for FSF schemes 
to include improper revenue recognition, overstatement of assets (other than accounts 
receivable related to revenue fraud), understatement of expenses/liabilities, misappropriation 
of assets and inappropriate disclosures. The ACFE’s Report (2012) indicated that FSFs 
causes the greatest loss to the corporate world while about half of all FSFs involve 
overstating revenues/assets. Other FSF schemes reported by COSO are improper accounting 
treatment, recording an asset at market value or some other incorrect value rather than cost, 
failing to charge proper depreciation or amortization against income, capitalising an asset 
when it should be expensed, improperly recording transfers of goods from related companies 
as sales, not recording liabilities to keep them off the balance sheet and omitting contingent 
liabilities (e.g., pending product liability lawsuits, pending government fines, and so on) from 
the financial statements. 
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According to Vanasco, (1998: 60), “fraudulent financial statements are of great concern not 
only to the corporate world, but also to the accounting profession. Every year the public has 
witnessed spectacular business failures reported by the media. .... Events such as unreported 
revenues, manipulation of losses, inflated sales, fraudulent write-offs of uncollectible 
accounts, unusual related-party transactions, misappropriation of assets and many other 
irregularities have spearheaded several court rulings and shaped the auditing standards.” 
Based on some observed trends, Hopwood et al. (2008) outlined the general features of FSF 
as follows: 
- The majority of fraud involves overstating revenues by recording them fictitiously or 
prematurely.  
- FSF is much more likely to occur in companies with decreased earnings, earnings 
problems, or a downward trend in earnings. 
- In a large majority of cases, either the CFO or CEO is involved in the fraud. 
- In many cases, the board of directors has no audit committee or one that seldom 
meets, or none of the audit committee members has the required skills to perform as 
intended. 
- The members of the board are frequently dominated by insiders (even related to 
managers) or by those with financial ties to the company.  
- Auditor changes occurred about one-fourth of the time in and around the time of the 
fraud.  
According to Higson (2003: 93), “although the Joint-Stock Companies Acts remained silent 
on the subject of fraud, the Punishment of Frauds Act 1857 strengthened the law against 
fraud, making it an offence for a director or officer of a company to alter falsely a company’s 
accounting records in order to defraud a creditor or a shareholder.” In furtherance to 
Higson’s comment, due to the magnitude of the incidence of financial statements fraud 
which, more than ever before in the history of modern business, is leading to court cases 
requiring auditors/ independent accountants as expert witnesses, many auditors and audit 
firms are now diversifying into a fast developing area of accounting, forensic accounting – 
13 
 
“the application of investigative and analytical skills for the purpose of resolving financial 
issues in a manner that meets standards required by courts of law” (Hopwood et al., 2012: 3). 
 
Internal Control Systems: The Nerve Centre of Auditing Role in Managing Corporate 
Fraud 
According to the ACFE’s Report (2012), 18.8% of fraud detection in the US was through the 
activities of auditors and this figure underscores the significance of auditing (as underpinned by 
effective internal controls) in fraud detection and management. In the words of Spira and Page 
(2003: 646), “risk in a financial context is generally understood to be the potential for 
financial loss consequent on fraud and incompetence. Although it is widely recognized that 
such risk can never be entirely eliminated, it is generally believed that a system of internal 
control will act as a deterrent to fraud and a protection against incompetence”.  
 
By definition, internal control is “the process designed and effected by those charged with 
governance, management and other personnel to provide reasonable assurance about the 
achievement of the entity’s objectives with regard to the reliability of financial reporting, 
effectiveness and efficiency of operations and compliance with applicable laws and 
regulations. It follows that internal control is designed and implemented to address identified 
business risks that threaten the achievement of any of these objectives.”  (ISA 315, Paragraph 
42).    
The internal audit function, on behalf of the management oversees the operation of an 
organisation’s internal control system. An internal control system comprises all policies and 
procedures adopted by the management of an entity to assist in their objective of achieving an 
orderly and efficient conduct of the business. This could be in the form of: 
- adherence to internal policies 
- safeguarding of assets 
- prevention and detection of fraud and error 
- accuracy and completeness of accounting records 
- timely preparation of reliable financial information 
14 
 
According to the COSO, “internal control is the process, effected by an entity’s board of 
directors, management and other personnel , designed to provide reasonable assurance 
regarding the achievement of objectives in the following categories: 
• Effectiveness and efficiency of operations 
• Reliability of financial reporting 
• Compliance with laws and regulations” 
The three main types of controls with which corporate frauds can be managed are preventive 
controls (authorisation controls, segregation of duties, organisational controls, supervisory 
controls, personnel controls, physical controls, arithmetic and accounting controls and 
management controls), detective controls (reconciliations, supervision, internal checks etc) 
and corrective controls (follow up procedures and management actions). The emphasis is 
always on the preventive controls and, to a lesser extent, corrective controls. 
According to Pickett (2005: 165), 74% of reported government fraud cases were caused by 
either the absence of proper control or failure to observe control procedures. This underscores 
the significance of internal controls in preventing frauds within an organisation.  
ISA 315 (understanding the entity and its environment and assessing the risks of material 
misstatement) identifies five elements of internal controls. These are:  
– The control environment (the overall attitude, awareness and actions of 
management regarding ICs and their importance) 
– The entity’s risk assessment (emphasises identifying business risks, estimating 
their significance, assessing the likelihood of their occurrence and deciding 
upon actions to manage them) 
– The information system (the procedures within both IT and manual systems by 
which the transactions are initiated, recorded, processed and reported) 
– Control activities (policies and procedures other than the control environment 
which are used to achieve the entity’s specific objectives) 
– Monitoring of controls (how internal controls are monitored and corrective 
actions are initiated) 
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Nowadays, majority of corporate governance codes require an objective and adequately 
resourced internal audit function capable of providing the board with assurance regarding the 
effectiveness of the system of internal control. In addition, it is also the responsibility of 
management to establish and oversee internal control systems capable of preventing and 
detecting corporate fraud. The internal audit function is considered as part of such control 
systems and the function is, in turn, required to test and monitor the effectiveness of other 
control systems. Its key roles include assessments of risks, controls and security and privacy 
compliance and its outputs is used by management for the purpose of decision making and 
control. Furthermore, as part of their annual audit plan, the internal audit function is required 
to consider management’s assessment of fraud risk as this will guide its adopted audit 
approaches and procedures. Besides, one of the yardsticks with which to measure an 
organisation’s devotion to effective internal control systems is the value it places on the 
internal audit function. 
For the internal audit function to be useful to management in their fraud prevention efforts, it 
should be supported and adequately resourced by top management and should, as much as 
possible, be objective and independent. The function should also determine if: 
o The organisational environment fosters control consciousness 
o Realistic organizational goals and objectives are set 
o Written corporate policies exist that describe prohibited activities and the 
action required whenever violations are discovered 
o Appropriate authorisation policies for transactions are established and 
maintained 
o Policies, practices, procedures, reports and other mechanisms are developed to 
monitor activities and safeguard assets, particularly in high-risk areas 
o Communication channels provide management with adequate and reliable 
information 
o Recommendations need be made to enhance or enhance cost-effective controls 
to help deter fraud  
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In addition, the internal audit function should place a high degree of attention to the audit trail 
process in order to enhance its ability to detect corporate fraud. The audit trail is the most 
important element in detecting fraud as it includes processes such as chain of custody, 
authorisations and approvals. It is the responsibility of the internal audit function to help 
management ensure that the audit trail is generated. Similarly, in order to help prevent and 
curb the incidence of corporate fraud, the internal audit function can support management to 
establish and operate physical security and monitoring processes, fraud reporting hotlines, 
training and education for staff members. 
Another important aspect of audit that relate to the internal control system is tests of control. 
Both external and internal audits carry out audit tests as a way of establishing the situation of 
an organisation’s internal control system. The test comprises of audit procedures aimed at 
assessing the effectiveness of the design and implementation of internal controls. It examines 
an organisation’s internal mechanisms, controls and processes to determine their adequacy 
and effectiveness and offer appropriate suggestions on the way forward.                               
 
Depending on the circumstances of a particular organisation, the following are the types of 
tests that may be carried out by auditors: 
• Walkthrough test – This is used to ascertain how the system’s objectives are being 
achieved 
• Compliance test – This is adopted to assess whether or not control mechanisms are being 
applied 
• Substantive test – This is carried out to test whether specific applicable control objectives 
are being achieved across the key areas of the entity’s policies and operations 
• Dual purpose test – This approach combines both compliance and substantive testing  on 
the same piece of evidence   
Whatever type of audit tests being carried out by the auditor, some of the techniques that can 
be adopted include: 
• Re-performance of the entity’s applications of the control by the auditors 
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• Observation of the application of specific controls within the organisation 
• Inspection of document, report, and electronic files 
• Reconciliation of records and accounts 
• Interviews of appropriate management, supervisor, and staff personnel 
• Confirmation from independent external entities such as customers, vendors and creditors  
      
On their part, external auditors will be interested in the internal control systems of their 
clients because its existence and level of effectiveness will determine the extent of 
substantive testing external auditors will be required to carry out in their audit work. 
Corporate legislation such as the UK’s Companies’ Act (2006) require that external auditors 
express an opinion on whether or not proper accounting records have been kept. Similarly, 
during the statutory audit, the external auditor should ascertain whether or not management 
has taken reasonable steps to control fraud. If management has not, the matter may be 
reported in the management letter. Also, auditing standards such as SAS300 require the 
external auditors to obtain an understanding of the control environment sufficient to 
determine their audit approach.  
The internal controls system remains the pivot upon which the wheel of the audit trinity 
rotates. It is the common denominator between the internal audit function, the external audit, 
the audit committee and the management. While the management is responsible for setting up 
an internal control system and an internal audit function for the purpose of fraud prevention 
among others, the internal audit function is charged with the responsibility of ensuring the 
effectiveness of the internal control systems. The external auditor is statutorily required to 
ascertain the presence and of expected control systems and evaluate the effectiveness of these 
controls with a view to (1) drawing conclusions on the suitability of these controls as bases 
for preparing the organisation’s financial statements, (2) reporting on the controls to the audit 
committee and (3) making recommendations on improving the internal control systems. The 
audit committee’s role is very central here as it is responsible for reviewing internal and 
external auditors’ reports on internal controls, risk and environmental management systems 
and management’s responses to these. It also reviews unusual transactions that are of 
18 
 
economic significance and supervises regulatory compliance, ethics, and whistleblower 
hotlines within the context of the organisation. Added to these, it is the audit committee’s 
duty to oversee the activities of both the internal and the external audit functions to ensure 
their effectiveness. This role of the audit committee entails the following: 
- Approves the appointment, retention, remuneration and removal of external auditors 
and the Chief Internal Auditor 
- Reviewing the scope of internal and external audit works 
- Co-ordinates the works of internal and external auditors and intervenes in cases of 
misunderstanding between the two sets of auditors  
- Monitors the objectivity and the independence of internal and external auditors 
Furthermore, the audit committee relates with the management in a way that will ensure good 
corporate governance and accountability part of which is the prevention and detection of 
corporate fraud. The committee does this through the following: 
- Reviewing accounting policies and any changes in respect to these 
- Reviewing applicable corporate code of conduct and monitoring management’s 
compliance with these 
- Monitoring compliance with legal and regulatory requirements 
- Reviewing interim financial and non-financial information and press releases before 
they are released (Porter, 2009: 173) 
   
Fraud and Internal Control in IT Environments  
The current level of sophistication in business information systems and the continuous trend 
of huge corporate investment in information and communication technology have taken 
corporate fraud to another level. Frauds emanating from this trend in technology adoption 
include electronic fund transfer fraud, hacking, credit card fraud, accounting fraud, money 
laundering, investment fraud, tele-marketing fraud and identity theft, illegal database access, 
intellectual property infringement, distorted versions of website, hacking (Newman and 
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Clark, 2003: 54; Pickett, 2005:166). These growing corporate fraud schemes are carried out 
through various techniques such as input manipulation, direct file or programme alteration, 
data theft, abuse of privileges and unauthorised access (Hopwood et al., 2008: 306).  
Inadequate controls within a computerised environment can portend economic and social 
dangers for an organisation. Corporate frauds constitute one of such dangers. The recently 
case of Kweku Adoboli, a rogue trader at Swiss bank UBS’ Global Synthetic Equities trading 
team in London is a good example. In this scandal, the bank claimed to have lost £1.4 billion 
as a result of unauthorized trading performed by Adoboli (Blacker, 2012). A similar case was 
that of Jerome Kerviel, a junior futures trader in Societe Generale (a leading French bank) in 
which the bank lost an unprecedented £3.9 billion (Samuel, 2012). Yet, another example was 
that of the “Natwest Three” (Giles Darby, David Bermingham and Gary Mulgrew) convicted 
in February 2008 for wire fraud against their former employer Greenwich NatWest, at the 
time a division of National Westminster Bank (Clark, 2010).  
However, an effective internal control system should be able to achieve the following within 
an IT environment: 
- Efficiency of IT operations in terms of producing the best through minimal resources. 
- Effectiveness of operations with regards to ensuring the IT objectives are achieved. 
- Reliability of IT-based information which relates producing reliable information in 
terms of accuracy and completeness. 
- Compliance with applicable laws and regulations specific to the organisation’s 
political, industrial and legal environments.     
In addition to the foregoing, the internal audit function should evaluate risk exposures 
relating to the organisation’s governance, operations and information systems. Also, auditing 
in a computer environment will require two special forms of controls, application controls 
and general controls. Application controls cover the transactions and master files which are 
specific to an individual application. These include completeness, accuracy and authorisation 
of input as well as controls over processing, output and master files. On the other hand, 
general controls cover the general environment within which application controls operate. 
These are controls over systems development, controls to prevent/detect errors during 
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program execution, controls to prevent/detect changes to data files and controls to ensure 
continuity of operations. 
 
The Role of Continuous Online Auditing in Managing Corporate Fraud 
Continuous Online Auditing (COA) is "a comprehensive electronic process that enables 
auditors to provide some degree of assurance on continuous information simultaneously 
with, or very shortly after, the disclosure of the information” (Omoteso et al., 2008). As 
online business transactions continue to be on the increase, efforts are mounting on the 
technological feasibility and the financial and economic viability of COA (Alles et al., 2002; 
Vasarhelyi, 2002; Pathak et al., 2005).  COA’s benefits to both internal and external audits 
include quick discovery and investigation of errors and fraud, reduction of post year end 
intensive work level, time saving, adequacy, sufficiency and reliability of audit evidence, 
timely feedback to clients/management, assurance of data accuracy, instant capture of 
transactions and control breaches and easier review (Omoteso et al., 2008).  
Instructively, COA could serve as a barrier to the occurrence of corporate frauds with the use 
of sophisticated ICT tools and techniques. These can be greatly enhanced through the design 
and use of appropriate artificial intelligence to function as Continuous Intelligent Online 
Validation capable of enhancing both the detective orientation (ex-post) and the preventive 
orientation (ex-ante) of COA (Helms, 2002; Omoteso et al., 2003). Furthermore, COA is 
capable of generating high powered instantaneous analysis of raw data which can make it 
possible to identify problems early and communicating the uncovered problems (e.g. internal 
controls deficiency) to the management for prompt corrective action. 
 
Higson (2002) suggested that it would be more appropriate for COA to be carried out by 
internal auditors because of its nature and logistics. Along the lines of Higson’s view, 
Voarino and Vasarhelyi (2002) assessed a bank’s internal continuous assurance process 
meant to provide directors and stakeholders with robust assurance of the dependability of 
financial and operating information through a set of corresponding activities such as online 
internal risk monitoring. This, according to Voarino and Vasarhelyi, would be able to meet 
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the challenges of the rapidly growing banking environment, regulatory authorities’ 
requirements and the structure of banking corporations. 
In addition to COA, Omoteso (2013) concluded that “the pattern observed thus far in the 
literature suggests that neural networks, DSS [decision support systems] models and ES 
[expert systems] capabilities will merge as veritable IT tools for auditors as this will combine 
their advantages to the greater benefit of all parties”. 
 
Conclusion  
Based on the tripartite audit function involving internal auditors as the internal corporate 
watchdog, external auditors as (he society’s corporate watchdog and audit committees as the 
internal and society’s corporate watchdog (through their oversight roles on both internal and 
external auditors), this chapter explained the nature, types and possible causes of corporate 
fraud within the context of business risk with a view to establishing how the three audit types 
can help in managing such frauds. The chapter also discussed the centrality of an entity’s 
internal control systems to the effectiveness of auditors’ roles in managing corporate fraud. 
As the trend in corporations’ adoption of information and communications technology tools 
and techniques in their operations continues unabated and predicted to impact and transform 
modern business practices, a new set of windows for corporate fraud continues to open. This 
chapter therefore examined the different kinds of fraud capable of being perpetrated in an IT 
environment and how an entity’s internal controls can be used to prevent and detect these 
growing fraud schemes. It also explored the usefulness of an emerging auditing system, 
continuous online auditing to auditors (particularly internal auditors) in corporate fraud 
prevention and detection.    
Although the chapter has accentuated the significance of internal control systems in the 
management of corporate fraud, it is instructive to note that certain factors can militate 
against their establishment/effectiveness. One of such factors is the costs involved in setting 
up and monitoring internal controls (including the internal audit function). The more complex 
and computerised an entity is, the more it will have to spend on its internal controls. 
However, if the cost of such controls is perceived to outweigh their anticipated benefits (that 
is the value of corporate fraud to prevent), it is only logical those in charge of governance 
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may be reluctant to establish such controls. Secondly, internal controls are set up and 
monitored by humans and for humans. Also, however perfect and strong internal control 
systems are, they can be beaten by humans. This may be due to employees spotting and 
capitalising on human errors (at set up or monitoring stages of internal controls), collusion of 
staff (particularly management staff), an outright by-passing or overriding of controls by 
management and, worse-still, auditors’ complicity. Therefore, the best way to manage 
corporate fraud is through preventive controls targeted at humans. These include offering 
staff competitive remuneration and packages, supportive working environments, avoiding 
setting unreasonable performance targets and positive control environments being 
championed by senior management and others in charge of governance within the 
corporation. These will reduce the incidence of corporate fraud from two angles. On the one 
hand, it will enhance employees’ intrinsic and extrinsic motivation and, on the other hand, it 
will improve auditor independence to operate impartially, competently and honestly.   
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